A Theory of Media That Explains 15 Years of Politics

Back in 2016 when Donald Trump won the first time there was this book. It was self-published by a former CIA media analyst named Martin Gurri. It became a kind of phenomenon in Silicon Valley. The book was called The revolt of the public. And what it did was describe the way that politics was changing because media was changing. What is cancel culture. Here’s an example of fake news in action and what to do about it. There was a great big fake interview, a fake news extravaganza. The ability to control the narrative was gone. And this was, Gurri argued, fundamentally unstable in country after country after country. It knew how to destroy. It did not know how to build. Gurri has in his own politics evolved. He didn’t vote in 2016 or 2020, but he voted for Trump in 2024. And he’s become much more positive about Trump this time than the first time. So I also thought his argument that Trump is maybe building the thing that could be stable in this informational era was worth hearing out. As always, my email at nytimes.com. Martin Gurri, welcome to the show. Great to be here. So in 2014, you published this book the revolt of the public. Lay out the basic argument you were making about attention and media and publics. Well, the argument of the book goes back to my days at CIA, where I was one of the least sexy jobs you could have. I was an analyst of global media, and it was a relatively straightforward job. I mean, you could if the president asked you, how are my how are my policies playing in France. You went to two newspapers that were considered those sources authoritative. That’s what we called them right around the turn of the century. This digital earthquake generated this tsunami of information that was essentially in parallel in human history. All right. And there’s numbers backing that up. And we just got swamped. And the first response, of course, is somebody who deals with authoritative information is what’s authoritative. This infinite mass of stuff. The second part was what’s the effect of it. All right. What is the effect of going from a world where information is extremely valuable to one that is so abundant that you don’t know what it’s worth. And there was a tsunami of information that we could track it as different countries digitize. And right behind it, we could see ever increasing levels of social and political turbulence. So the book is trying to explain that. What became very clear was that our entire 21st century said of the institutions that hold up modern life. The government, the media, business, academia were shaped in the 20th century. Very top down, very hierarchical, very. I talk, you listen. So what the internet did, what the digital revolution did was essentially create the possibility of this gigantic information sphere that was outside of the institutions. All right. And it turned to the institutions. And the first one they turned to was your business media. It was this big fight between the blogs and the mainstream media was like the enemy. And sure enough, when that happens, you can find many errors and many mistakes and some bad faith in the institutions. And I think it’s institutional failure and elite failure that sets the information agenda on the web. I mean, that’s pretty clear. It can be any number of things, but the total effect of that is a gigantic erosion of trust in the institutions, which then builds up this digital world that is non-institutional, even stronger. So it’s kind of an inversion of what had gone on before you had the Walter Cronkite of the world very respected, most trusted man in America. Think of a journalist such as yourself being voted the most trusted man in America today. It’s not even a joke. I mean, give me time. O.K, Walter. One thing that I took from your book and that’s held with me for a long time, is that you have to understand media and attention as a separate causal stream into politics. And I don’t think we like to do that. We like to think about politics as a relentlessly rational response to mostly material conditions, maybe cultural conditions, maybe the quality of elites, maybe the quality of governance, maybe inflation. And I understood what you were saying. Then you can tell me if this is wrong, that there was no this other dynamic happening, which is that the nature of the information flow now had created. It just creates a constant pressure for distrust. That fractured media will always point out the problems in governance, creating very fast backlashes to whatever the status quo is, such that the status quos get overturned and overturned. The populist right comes in over the establishment, then they become unpopular, or the establishment comes back that it’s this endless ricocheting. But that’s not necessarily just about material conditions. It’s about the dynamics of information having a momentum of their own. Yeah I mean, I believe that the information structure is one of the most determinative factors in any society. It shapes it shapes the landscape. It’s an ecological force. So if you are dealing with a mass media 20th century style, it’s top down again and you need to have a printing press or a TV station. And that takes a certain kind of overhead and money and you can’t talk back to it. So the mood of information that’s slightly Marshall McLuhan ish is, I think, make my heart beat faster. Yeah no, no, I’m a semi McLuhan. I think he was right on about a lot of things. And I think one of the things he was right about is that the primary aspect, as we talk about everything else, everything else is downstream for how we exchange information. So politics is downstream. Even culture is downstream, O.K. Because it gets exchanged in certain media. So now I would say in part, you’re right, that the rise of digital media just crashed into a world constructed around analog media and broke it to pieces. And there’s the question of digital media in and of itself, stimulates controversy, stimulates its hostility, political hostility, if not political, some kind of hostility. But I think also it uncovered a lot of let’s say, negativity, a lot of negation towards the institutions that were almost certainly already there that was masked by that former system, top down. The New York Times’ is talking down at you. You don’t get to pick up your comment section and say, New York Times, you’re wrong. Or to go to X, New York Times you’re wrong. You just got to either throw it away or write a letter to the editor or something along those lines. So I think a lot of the hostility, a lot of the negation, a lot of what’s happened with the public, which is now it’s a global, it’s a global phenomenon. It’s by no means we Americans are very provincial, by no means an American monopoly. This rise was there. It was just masked by the previous information system. And this information system stimulated but also releases it. Here’s a question that I think about a fair amount. Do you think the institutions of today, the elites of today across different domains media, military, government, economics, business, do you think they’re worse than they were. Or we have access to so much more information and critique of them that we think they’re worse than they were. Or does access to all that information make them worse than they were, because they have less room to move and to act and to correct mistakes. I think there is no question that we think that they’re worse because we know so much more about them, right. I mean, how many sex scandals that we know about today would never have come up in the 20th century. I also think, however, that they are particularly bad, and they’re particularly bad because they haven’t made the leap to the new information system. In other words, in the 20th century, we had people like Kennedy and Reagan, people who were masters of television, they knew. They knew the information systems that they were conveying their message on. Today, the elites, as a rule number one, because they’re old. But number two, because even the young people tend to have old heads. Just about number 3, because it’s a very uncomfortable medium, because you do get talked back a lot. So I think what we need and what we haven’t gotten yet, although this crowd with Trump, that may be the beginning, is people who are just totally comfortable with this crazy information system. Trump, for example, on Twitter, he was like the Beethoven of Twitter in his first in his first term, basically. He is the guy who said, no, I did everything wrong. Whatever scandal. He’s like this gigantic bull seal, with the hide so thick that no matter what stab that thing with it just kind of doesn’t even touch him, right. And he’s full of scars. But that’s his magic. That is the guy’s magic, is that he’s already done all the things. You can’t find any skeletons in my closet because all the skeletons are right here in my living room. And you can see them. And I don’t care, right. O.K am I for that No but it gives you some idea of how you need a kind of an elite that deals with the fact that whatever you do, that if you project an image that is false, you’re going to crash, you’re going to burn and crash. Here is my revolt of the public informed model of the past decade or so. In American politics, you have this almost hydraulic informational process by which high engagement movements. People or ideas that create a lot of energy rise. But you then have this counter process by which their opposite then begins to arise as soon as they gain power. So you have Barack Obama, who’s followed by really his opposite in a striking way in Donald Trump. But then as Donald Trump rises in power, you get this counter vibe to Donald Trump, the resistance, Black Lives Matter, MeToo, wokeness. We now call it I think Biden’s complicated here because he’s Barack Obama’s vice president, but he’s so not of this era that in some ways, I think he’s informationally almost a pause. But then Trumpism comes roaring back with even more force. And what fascinates me about this period is not that it doesn’t seem to be selecting. For one thing, it is selecting almost endlessly for the strongest thing, and then the opposite of the strongest thing. And it’s this crazy ricochet process. How much do you buy that explanation of what’s been going on. What I can say is what you said is true at the descriptive level. Back forth, back forth, back forth. What I think is happening is trial. Error trial. Error trial. Some the electorate is searching for somebody to make sense politically out of this moment. And so far everybody has failed. Everybody has failed. Obama did O.K. He got reelected. But in the end, he did he did not set the standard for how we deal for Politics at the presidential level in the digital age. Trump came out, Biden came out. Now we have Trump. Who knows what’s going to happen if Trump succeeds. It may be that that’s the model. The odds are massively against it, just massively against it. Well, let’s talk a bit about the Biden era. One thing that you emphasized a lot in that, and you were pretty critical of Joe Biden, is that the form of the elite that he led the Democratic Party in that era became defined around what you call the politics of control. What’s the politics of control. Well, first of all, I want to apologize to Joe Biden. If I had known. I mean, you could see that the guy wasn’t there. All right. But if I had known the degree to which he really was not in charge of anything. I’ve read you on this. I think you’re wrong on this. I mean, that’s pretty clear to me. Whoever was running the White House during that time, I think had that impulse to go back to the 20th century and the ideal internet for people like that would be the New York Times’ circa 1958 or something, front page of the New York Times’ 1958. That’s the way information should be. And they have converted this into some almost this is a fairly recent development and almost ideological construct, where they now seem to be promoting what you might call a guided society. Where the ordinary people like me and others need Sherpas to make sure we don’t fall off the cliffs and keep going upwards. And onwards. So we’re protected against disinformation, we’re protected against hate, and we’re protected against all these other things. Attempt to erect a censorship apparatus that would de-emphasize people or silence people, silenced certain voices, silenced certain opinions, get experts and bureaucrats to basically proclaim that certain truths were false. And it was a futile attempt. I mean, it was completely futile as it was happening. And of course, it led. I think it paved the way to Trump. I come from Cuba, where censorship. I didn’t know you came from Cuba. Oh, Yes, I was by the time I was 10, I had experienced a pretty Stern right wing censorship and a left wing dictatorship that basically killed the media. I mean, there was no media left, so pretty touchy about that thing. And I guess I have antennae that can feel things coming. And Thank God for the First Amendment. They can’t do it here. Well, let me pick up on something there, because this feels to me like it is completely fundamental right now to the right’s self-definition. JD Vance goes to the Munich Conference, tells the Europeans they’re doing too much to restrict speech and expression and political expression in their countries. And then I look at what people do. I look at, say, Elon Musk has made cis or cisgender. He has tagged that as hate speech on X. I’m watching the Trump administration tell all the agencies they have to go through. And look for words that are now out of favor, diversity and DEI and things like that. And it all has to be erased. They’ve ended up knocking out things they didn’t mean to knock out because the war just happened to be there in another context. So I kind of see this world of people who I think understand themselves as free expression Warriors. And then as soon as they get into power, whether it’s running x or running the government, they certainly seem to me to be on a campaign of censorship. What do you think I’m missing. I mean, I you’re missing dimension. I think the dimension of censorship under Biden. He basically told the platforms you have to adhere to European standards of good behavior online. Well, the Europeans don’t have a First Amendment right. And the Europeans honestly, we tend to think of them as being just like us when it comes to speech. And this has always been the case, and it is more the case every day. There’s like halfway between US and China. All right. So I think the difference is that, O.K. Do you as an ordinary person feel like you can say whatever you want. All right. If you don’t like x, you can go to blue sky or something. But that was true then too. You could go to Rumble. You could go to gab. You could go to Truth Social. The thing I want to push you on a little bit here because I’m not saying there was no I think your point, as I take it, is interesting that partially what you’re saying people like the Biden administration respond to is an effort to try to get control of an information space that they no longer know how to control and even no longer know how to operate in. But I am struck by seeing very, very aggressive movements from the Trump administration immediately to impose control on what say civil servants can say so. Is that a dynamic of the left that you’re describing, or is it just now in this era of information overload. Actually, both sides are fighting for control of it and whatever their professed values, as soon as they get into power, the thing they really want to do is decide what the boundaries are and what you can say and how you could say it. And well, let’s give it time. I mean, you may be right. All I have to say is I find it remarkable. I find it remarkable. Look, you can look at me. I am not a young man, all right. That free speech is a right wing cause. All right. When did that happen. O.K I mean, you have several. All of them left people. John Kerry recently, most recently bemoaning the existence of the First Amendment. I have never seen that in my entire life. Everybody always pretended at least they were for free speech. Even when secretly they wanted to control it, even when secretly they were trying to control it. They always talked the talk. And now, only on the left, you find people saying, no, we need boundaries. We need this. We need that. We need protection against. So that’s my take on that. You may be right. Maybe that this crowd ends up being even worse. So we got to watch that. I don’t really they’re not I am not AI am an independent politically and I have no dogs in the political fight. But in the free speech fight, I’m all in. Well, tell me about your movement on this. So 2016, you don’t vote, 2020. You don’t vote 2024, you vote for Donald Trump. What movie do you towards him in that period. In large part, it was that. It was that it was free speech. It was normalizing the censorship of things that in the olden days, me as a 60s guy, O.K, very, very aging hippie, O.K, felt like, this is crazy. This is crazy. This is what we fought for in the 60s, was to be able to say whatever we wanted to and to expand that to whatever the limit is. That doesn’t break down social peace. So that was my number one thing. Now, number two thing was I just felt like the world was becoming more and more dangerous. And I knew regardless of what you say, that this was an empty skin suit in the White House, and that we were just like an airplane on automatic pilot, circling and circling, waiting to run out of gas. And I do not love Donald Trump. I never have, but I felt like he was for free speech. And he’s a live brain in the White House. Well, hopefully he will be more than that. But you also say something else that I have found a lot of people felt this time. I think it is underestimated how much the meaning of Donald Trump changed. Yes from 2016 to 20 20 to 2024. Yes And and you write that Trump this time had become a kind of mythical figure that he has been, quote, transformed into a living symbol of the progressive elites abuse of power and contempt for the principle of equality. I have heard something like that from a lot of people, and particularly the mythic dimension of Trump Yes Tell me what you mean by that and how you felt that change in your own perspective. Well, I mean, I can tell the moment it happened where I suddenly went. Geez, O.K. It was that near assassination episode where I don’t know how lucky you’ve been, but if you’ve been lucky, you have never been in a place where bullets are flying. I come from Cuba. I can tell you when bullets start flying. You think you’re a hero until that moment. And then you hit the ground and you make a pancake. And here’s a man who not only was being shot at, but had been hit, and he probably had no idea how badly. And stood up and told the Secret Service agents. Just presence of mind you, you people have knocked my shoes off. I’m going to put on my shoes. I’m going to turn to the crowd. I’m going to say fight. And that number one, that took a lot of courage. Just basically physical courage. Number two. Presence of mind. All right. But there’s a third element. And I don’t even know what to do with that one. I mean, you can call it the providential interpretation of Trump. He thinks that God saved him to make America great again. Or you can give a mathematical explanation. He’s kind of like a strange attractor and these incredible coincidences keep happening all around him that completely defy the laws of probability. The fact that the bullet missed him. That image where he’s standing there shaking his fist at, and he’s got those Secret Service agents wrapped protectively around, and there’s a flag in the background. What are the odds of that thing happening. Happening spontaneously. No wonder people think it was. It was acted right. But if you look at the last Oh, eight years, there’s one series of bizarre questions. How did he beat Hillary Clinton. How did his popularity resurrect from January 6, 2021? How did he just kind of dispose of a pretty good field of Republican aspirants, including proven winners like DeSantis. I mean, endless numbers of questions. Every event tends to skew in his direction. You can say that what he did, being exiled and coming back was kind of a hero’s journey. That’s not necessarily a moral quality. And he could do many bad things with all those qualities. But that’s part of what I think the mythic side of Trump is, the fact that the world around him is not the world around the rest of us. I think there are seasons to the way we understand the world. And I think certainly in the Obama era, we were in a season of empirics technocracy. And I don’t just mean that in terms of literally the reports people produced and the way they argued, I also mean it in terms of the aesthetic. Yeah And this is a point my colleague Ross Douthat has made. But it’s also something that I’ve been thinking about that it has felt to me for some time, we’re re-entering a slightly more mystic Dick mythic turn of the wheel. I think you see it in the popularity of Catholicism, with its pomp and circumstance and its strangeness of Greek orthodoxy. The return of astrology as a major force. And something about Trump ended up fitting that for a lot of people at least. I’m not saying that I have this particular interpretation of him, but the degree to which I think even within his own movement, he is treated, as I’ve said this many times before, that he’s almost like the Grand Ayatollah of national conservatism, that what people even the people who like him, don’t view him as this precise technical policy thinker. They view him as somebody with a kind of intuitive, almost spiritual connection to the country that they see him leading, the people they see him representing, and then the revolving around him of all these other powerful figures like Musk and so on. It made him more like this. It wasn’t just his show anymore. He became like this, quasi demigod like or Pope figure presiding over a moment. Yeah no, I think you’re 100 percent right. And that’s actually a pretty deep observation. And having lived through the 60s, which is kind of like that, astrology brought it to mind, but there was that sense of mysticism, almost of connection to something beyond just everyday life. There must be something more to it than this. I think there’s a huge hunger for that right now. I think a lot of our politics sublimate that, honestly. It’s possible to measure empirically. I don’t know how you do that, but I profoundly believe that. I think we have been living through a period of Yeah, I think the Obama era was cool, calm, collected the rule of technocratic technocracy. And that was very flavorless, I think, for a lot of people, people want red meat. And I mean, what is Trump, right. I mean, he’s literally red meat. So I think we’re beginning this era. I think that’s more down the road. So let’s keep our eyes open because it can manifest itself in a number of good or bad ways. Well, it’s also cooperation versus dominance. I think that the promise of the Obama era of Obama himself, in a way, was could cooperate your way to this future. You could talk your way, think your way through the conflicts and Trump. And I think something I see people responding to. But I’ve been in DC this week talking to people from different factions of the right, and something they all say is that America is strong. And we stopped throwing around that strength, that we have the ability to shape events in our image and to our desires and to our interests. And we found ourselves in ways that we didn’t have to. We have this huge economy, but we didn’t use things like tariffs to make others bend to our will. We let ourselves get taken advantage of by China. We don’t do any territorial expansion anymore. Things in the 19th century, early 20th century were more common in terms of American policy. Have become like morally uncommon, not just a thing. We don’t do, but a thing. We don’t even consider doing. And Trump is a bringing back of this old spirit, a kind more domineering frontier you use your strength to reshape the world energy. Yeah, I think there’s some truth in that. I would say that a lot of the people that I know who are pro-trump, and they tend to be ridiculously people that I read and not people that I feel that he’s not their dominator. He’s their liberator. In other words, he’s the guy who’s breaking up this very dominating system of elite institutional governance and allowing the normies, as they call themselves to do what they wish. All right. I think the word frontier that you used is critical. And I mean, this is a great country. I mean, I’m an immigrant, right. So I feel like the frontier spirit is part of my spirit. I think Americans basically, that’s who they are. They have this craving for some far frontier like thing that they must master or conquer or populate or coordinate. It doesn’t really matter. The modality doesn’t matter. It’s the challenge that matters. And I think honestly, under Obama, there was no real challenge. What were we headed towards. It was unclear. And I think for the moment and we’ll see with Trump, for the moment, the clarity is in the negation and undoing that controlling apparatus that the Biden administration had set up. I think if you are a Normie liberal, let’s call it. Yeah the way you are experiencing Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Doge broadly, the Russell vote, the war on what now gets called the Administrative state is as this incredible assertion of power is maybe even a constitutional crisis. They went in, they just destroyed USAID in a day. That wasn’t something that people thought you could do. They fired huge numbers of federal workers saying it was for cause, even though it had nothing to do with their individual job performance. Knocked out all these probationary workers. They’ve tried to break huge amounts of the federal government. Reshape it to their will. The way that has been experienced by liberals is as an extraordinary assertion of control of power that the executive is not supposed to have. The way you’ve described it, the way seen other people describe it, is as an act of breaking up control. I’d like you to try to describe how it looks from that perspective. Thinking about an audience who is experiencing it in the opposite way. Well, I mean, I was probably amplified by Facebook at some point. I don’t even know why I said, but when my wife would send out my articles, they got a lot more response than when I sent out my articles on Facebook. And I think when Mark Zuckerberg saw the light, suddenly realized I don’t like censorship anymore. Strangely, after Donald Trump got elected, I think that is the way that the people on this side and I. I’m not a Trumpist. Like I said, I believe in free speech. And I thought the idea that you were supposed to say certain words. I mean, the right has never had this power, O.K. The power to impose certain words, the power to basically come up with entirely new definitions about things that were pretty settled who’s a man and who’s a woman. Been settled since Adam and Eve and all these constantly changing new permutations of ideas that were not intuitive. Let’s put it that way, but mandatory for from the moment they get proclaimed. And by whom. I don’t even know. I had a friend who was a professor, and this was like years ago, about five or six years ago. And I him, what’s it like. He says, it’s like a mind clearing operation. Being in college, you have college professors. Sooner or later, something’s going to blow up on you. So it’s not just the elites being controlling. It’s a kind of a culture of control or an ideology of control. There is, I think, an element of revolt of the public in it. So I understand the culture you’re reacting to here. I see where you’re coming from on that. But I want to keep focused on the actual acts of the president here, because I’ll note that I’ve asked you about the dismantling of USAID, which you’ve written columns on the actions of Doge, which you’ve written pieces on. You move to whether or not Facebook shadowbanned you. I don’t know if Facebook shadowbanned you. If they did, they shouldn’t have. Yeah but the actions of the administration have been your guy from Cuba have been the assertion of an extraordinary amount of executive control over the administrative state, things that the can tell you, the Biden administration did not think they were allowed to do. The Obama administration did not think they were allowed to do. The amount of stories I have heard about how difficult it is to work through the privacy regulations of the IRS in order to make social insurance programs be smoother, and in the end, they just weren’t that smooth because everybody was so concerned about privacy and you just couldn’t get access to the systems, they just come in and they like bust their way to the systems. So again, when you see them doing this and you see this not as the taking of control, but the breaking of a controlling apparatus, try to describe that perspective on it for someone who doesn’t share it. I mean, you must know enough liberals to know that they are experiencing this era of Trump and Musk and Doge as the dawning of authoritarianism. Like, how do you tell them to see it from the way you’re seeing it. Yeah I mean, what is authoritarianism? That one. I do know that most of my friends are liberals. They don’t think he’s an authoritarian, though. What is he doing to the government. O.K what I see is being done is the very earliest moment in which AI collides with the analog world. That IRS thing you were describing. I mean, I was a bureaucrat for many, many years at CIA. So I know perfectly well how that works. First of all, there’s all these controlling mandates. In the end, they all check CheckMate each other. So you have this paralysis and it’s all take this sheet of paper, write the memo, take it here, take it there. And at the end, it gets lost and nothing happens. What you have is Elon Musk applying AI to all those rules and regulations, and you can identify exactly where you can go. Perfectly legal. It’s not clear that it’s perfectly legal. Well, it is not unclear to me. I mean, they’re moving so fast that there’s probably a lot I don’t know. But for example, USAID was set up by executive order. So you can crash that down by executive order. There was no act of Congress. No it was set up by Congress in 1998. Its current structure was created through Congress. I mean, it is USAID is statute. Well, all I can tell you is I see this as the application of the human AI mind to the analog world. And it let’s put a legality aside. It allows for. The identification of things that can be cut at a way faster than the analog minds can follow. And I have to ask you if you want to be an authoritarian. Are you going to come back to government. I mean, let me tell you, I have lived under authoritarians cutting back. The government is not what they do see, but I don’t think that they’re cutting back the government. I think they are trying to take control of it I have heard this, I think, from a couple people, and I follow it closely, and I am open to the idea that one thing Elon Musk wants to do is bring AI into the federal government. I am not super open to the idea that that’s what Doge is doing. Now for one thing with the word efficiency, it’s always efficiency. For what AI for what. Every AI system has some kind of value function, some kind of prompt you have to be giving it. The question of the prompt is really then the important question. Like, Yes, you could in theory unleash AI on the entire range of Treasury payment data. What are you trying to get it to find. If you’re trying to get it to find fraud, fine. How is fraud defined. Like what do you say is fraud I don’t even think. Really, to be honest with you. That’s what you think they’re doing. Like you wrote a good piece, I think. Just not from my perspective about why you thought it was good that they were getting rid of USAID. Like, what was that argument. My take on USAID is that what was the point of it. What was the point of it. And you look at a lot of the programs that we’re doing. There clearly was no point. They were trying to find some point where we give aid. What do we give aid for. Well, in the old days, it was we fought the Commies. And if we could bribe some government or some movement or something to fight the communists along with us, we didn’t care how corrupt that was. It was good. Now they’re on our side. But now we’re not in that kind of a world anymore. So these people are not sophisticated thinkers of what to do with government mission and what you were saying, which is to what end is the ultimate key. All right. So I am with them so far, but because the government is just such a monstrous bloat that honestly, what they’re doing is fingernail parings. But to what end. To what end. What is do any of these people and the Trump administration have an image in their minds of once we’ve taken the government and we squeezed it and we broke it and we reshaped it, and now it’s going to do what. And I am not sure I have not seen that anywhere. Some maybe marginal people to the Musk minions. There’s this Substack person mysterious called echo. I don’t know if you’ve read his stuff. Yeah, as close to an ideologist. And maybe this is a fantasy world, but he persuades you that with AI, the president has basically the entirety of the government becomes intelligible and it becomes intelligible horizontally. So you can follow every agency that is trying to find little cutouts and rabbit holes to hide waste in or whatever, but it’s also intelligible vertically. So if you are allocating money for a bridge repair, it can. It can show you the bridge repair the actual bridge and what’s actually being repaired. But I mean, it’s utopian stuff. It’s very utopian stuff about where do we get to this bottom up world or whatever. They themselves have not said anything. They have. They are not very articulate about this. And it should we be paying attention. Yeah should we think that it’s authoritarianism that are doing it. I don’t think so. The kind of I mean, I haven’t read echo, I have seen these let’s put all government on the blockchain ideas before. And both I think they tend to reflect people who are not trying to follow where the government spends its money, because actually we know quite a lot about that. And people just don’t like doing the spade work. But here’s one argument. It’s an argument that I think you agree with, but I’ve heard it from other people. So let me try to state it as generously as I can, which is that the administrative state is a unelected fourth branch of government, that in this era of the revolt of the public, that it is not just frustration about information, it is frustration about unresponsiveness. Government doesn’t work. It doesn’t do what you tell it to. You don’t feel it in your life. And when you do feel it, it’s often not felt in a good way, and particularly for the right, because the government is staffed by liberals, because liberals like the government better than the right does. So you’re more likely to work for the government if you’re liberal. It gets even harder. Like you come in as a anti-government disrupter like Donald Trump was in 2017, and you find you’re stymied left and right by these procedures, by these processes, by these bureaucrats, by these civil servants. And so what you’re trying to do is like, break this power center that stands between the people and the government they elect. And I think the thing that I am personally surprised by a little bit is how much the right has adopted this view that the executive is the will of the people. And the idea is that you need to give Donald Trump this power because he is the accountable one, and it should just do what he says in a pretty much unquestioned way. And that is what that is responsiveness. And you break the administrative state. So these populist leaders getting elected atop public dissatisfaction can control it and make whatever it is they think the people want. What really matters, honestly, is the restoration of trust. I think today trust has just evaporated. And I think we can discuss the Justice of that. I think there is some justice to it. I think some of it is utopian expectations versus just the way the world actually runs. But there it is. It has evaporated. What is done. Honestly, as long as there is no law breaking or anything like that, whatever it gets done, whatever gets broken. If you can restore the trust of the public in Democratic institutions, then you will have done a good thing. Whether these people can do it, that’s a serious question. I think this creates an interesting question about whether or not there is a corollary theory to yours that it’s not what we are living through repeatedly right now is not revolts of the public, but revolts of elites. Let me try to make this argument to you and see what you think. So you look at the public. It’s moving by a couple points in each election, right. The movable public is narrow. But if you look at the elites, who are all on Twitter talking to each other or X or Facebook or whatever, they’re swinging unbelievably far. Election to election. They get elected. Joe Biden gets elected in a fairly narrow election, by historical standards. And they come in certain even though they have a 50/50 Senate Majority, that what the public wants is an FDR sized presidency. The Trump people are all talking to each other on X on Twitter, and they’re in these intense communication dynamics with each other. They have, I think, by any measure, a very narrow victory. And they believe that it’s time to remake the entire state. They’re going to this is like the new dawning of the populist right era, that what’s really swinging here is not normies. What’s really swinging here are elites. They’re the ones most exposed to the communication dynamics you’re describing, because they are really intensely on these platforms talking to each other, that it’s actually the distance now between the elites and the public of both sides, that the ricocheting is not really happening among people who don’t care about politics that much. It’s happening among the people who do. It’s like nobody comes in and says, that was a pretty small win. We should be careful here. There’s no welfare reforms anymore. There’s no Child Left Behind. There’s no big SOPs to the other side. It’s all like we won by a bit. And now the revolution. Yeah, there’s an element of truth in that. I would say that I think you have the public wrong because the public is not two sided. The public is fractured into many, many, many pieces. All right. And those pieces tend to coalesce if you are. Sometimes they do it spontaneously in protest, for example, and they don’t need an elite to tell them to go to Tahrir square or Plaza Del Sol or whatever. And they mobilize entirely by being against. In other words, the second you say, well, what do you stand for. It’s like, well, I’m for this and for that. You take the crowd in Tahrir square you had socialists, you had the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood. You had just everyday Egyptians. You had all kinds of people that if you asked them, what do we do next in terms of running, they would start fighting with each other. But they were all against Mubarak. They were all against Mubarak. And the public is against, and I think against is a very mobilizing emotion. And the thing we have to watch out and I’ve been saying this for years, is, O.K, take it to its logical conclusion. You become a nihilist. You basically believe that destruction is a form of progress. Now that’s my flag for the Trump guys, right. Is that are they are they tearing this out to a purpose. They’re going to a purpose. I’m willing to put up with a lot of noise, a lot of mistakes. There’s no way this gets done tidily. All right. If there’s a purpose and I approve of the purpose, I don’t see a purpose. But are you doing it just because you can. But I do think it’s good to argue about the public, because I take your point about Tahrir square. But here in America, what’s amazing in some ways is the stability. We have not had an election decided by more than five 5 points in the popular vote since 2008. And that was during a financial like a once in a generation financial crisis. We keep talking about the public, particularly after elections, as if it’s been these overwhelming things. And the truth is, most people vote the way they did before, right. Because I think the two party system is a completely artificial construct. The two parties don’t really hold too much allegiance anymore. They’re among the institutions that have lost a great deal of trust. And if you look at the numbers, the number of independents keeps growing. And what is an independent. Well, that’s 100 different things. All right. So I think part of the difficulty of this political moment is that we look at it in very old fashioned ways a Democrat, Republican. And you look I look at the ground level and I see this fermenting mosaic of different passions. I think it’s very fluid. I do think it’s very fluid. Maybe the total numbers, overall numbers, not so. And as long as we get given this choice of Republican and Democrat, maybe that won’t change. But I’m wondering how long that’s going to last. I mean, I wonder that too. Or at least what the nature of being Republican and Democrat is. Yeah I mean, it used to be very different. Democrats were the much more racist party in America for a very, very long time. I know I landed in Virginia when it was still Jim Crow and there were no Republicans. Things things change. There’s been this argument that the parties are in this weird transition to be a Republican in good standing, you need to believe the institutions are fundamentally broken. That is what Trump represents. That’s why RFK jr. can fit in the coalition now, despite being a pro-choice Democrat a couple of years ago because he fundamentally believes the institutions are corrupt or broken, do not represent the people, et cetera, and that the Democratic Party and I think it is in tension over this with itself, but certainly under Biden and Harris was very, very pro system party. It’s not really about liberal and conservative. The reason Mitt Romney and Liz Cheney were clearly in coalition with Kamala Harris, while RFK jr. and Tulsi Gabbard were in coalition with Donald Trump, is because what politics is fundamentally about is changing, and neither side has fully known how to express that change. It’s still nascent. It’s a transition from one kind of system and one kind of polarization to another. No, I mean, you’re 100 percent right in that we’re still speaking words that make no sense when you attach them to what’s actually happening out there. And I would point out that not that long ago, Barack Obama was elected and he was going to be a transformational figure. He was not elected to be Lord over the institutions. He really and he had a style of governance and a rhetoric that allowed him, while still being president and in charge of everything, to distance himself from the institutions so he could say all these. Criticize even the government very sharply as being racist or. Anti-feminist or whatever. And yet there he was. He was the president. That would have been a moment where the Democrats could have seized that high ground. I guess so even what you’re saying, what you’re describing is just. Of now, at the times of the first Obama election, 2008, I guess the Democrats were the ones who were trying to storm the institutions and change them. Yeah, I think that the movement for the Democrats to become the pro institutions party has been they have lost something pretty important. And I think that the really talented politicians could keep that in balance Obama. Yeah and Biden, who is very much a creature of Washington and was just by the time he was governing too old to make a balancing act like this work, couldn’t. And if you lose the mantle of reform, I think it’s very hard to win in American politics today. For a fact. And I think that’s true on both sides. I think there is a core of people who have, because just of the accident of fate that the Democrats or even more the Democrats anti-trumpism has been identified with pro institutionalism. It’s a core of people who then will stand up. I mean, there was a woman, as I said, ubered here. There was a woman standing on a street corner here in Washington with a sign that said, God bless the federal workforce. Just standing there with that sign. So God bless her, I was one of them. But the vast majority of Americans at the level of the publics of the various mosaics want, want reform, want change went against. They are not for the institutions. They have no faith in them. So I would say that for the Democratic Party to regain its mojo. I mean, what they need us. What is it that they would like to change to bring government this enormous construct. Modern government is enormous, towering, daunting construct down to the level of a human being. How do you humanize that thing. In some bizarre way, that’s what Trump is trying to do. Without thinking about it very much. But the Democrats are even thinking, here’s what I worry about with Trump. I mean, among many things, I have many worries about Donald Trump. But one is that the way he’s humanizing it is through himself. And you were saying earlier this question of for what. What is at the end of all this breakage? What steady state are they trying to achieve. I found the Eric Adams thing extremely, extremely alarming and telling because here’s a guy who is under investigation for what appear to be pretty clear, acts of corruption. He’s a Democratic mayor, right. He’s not somebody who Donald Trump needs to be loyal to. And it seems like what they saw was the ability. And frankly, what Eric Adams saw was the possibility that if he would signal to Trump that he would pledge allegiance, he would be in Trump’s pocket. Trump would take the heat off of him. When I look internationally, I see a similar thing. The countries that are willing to tell Trump he’s great and show they’re on his side. Be that Russia or anybody else, they can get the deal. And if you’re not willing to do that can’t get the deal that the thing on the other side of this is patronage as a personalist regime where what you do doesn’t matter. What matters is who you pledge fealty to. Yeah I won’t touch the Adams case because I don’t really know the details of whether that case was good or not. But I think what the sensation is of the people on his side is here are all these bureaucrats, this deep state and these Democrats and so forth who have been lording it over us, and now they realize they’re just like me. They’re crying out just like we’ve been crying out. But they weren’t listening when we cried. And now he’s making them cry out. So I think it’s a case of the high being brought down as much as. And I’m not going to deny that. It’s a huge personalistic aspect of Trump, starting with Trump himself. But I think it has much of that as he is perceived as the hero who’s bringing the high down low right. And that is very humanizing. And it’s very even democratizing if you believe that that’s what’s happening. So then if you don’t think that’s what it is, it’s not just personalism. It’s not just a government that Trump and Musk can control for whatever purposes they want to control it. What’s your positive vision of this. Like you said, it’s what made me think it’d be interesting to have you on the show for this, that this was the first time you saw a revolt like this moving beyond negation. You saw it moving to some kind of positive agenda. When you are feeling hopeful, what do you think they are trying to do. And what do you think they might try to do with this system if they can, grasp it in their fist? If you tell me what I would hope it would all end up as is, it would be a much leaner, far more responsive, far less politicized, far more AI friendly, far more digitized. Therefore, the levels of hierarchy much lower than what we had in the 20th century and trusted by the people, trusted by the people. So if you have a government that is, say, the equivalent of in many cases when you talk about services of Amazon. Amazon is this thing you trust it, you push a button and it’s there on your doorstep O.K. The government, you go with a paper and you have to go, please can you do this. And they say, no, you have to change. You have to do it. You do it. So my ideal vision of where a Democratic, small D Democratic government in Washington would be federal government would be one that is very flat, very responsive, very interactive, very AI driven, very digitized and trusted by the people, trusted by the people. Two things or a couple of things come up for me when you offer that vision. And I’m not saying you’re saying it’s their vision, but one is that providing what responsive to what. I mean, this is a group that is about to do cuts to food stamps or SNAP, as it’s called now, cuts to Medicaid. This question of what is this leaner government providing and what is it not providing, seems like a much more fundamental question. And then also there’s this question of whether or not responsiveness is in the way you’re talking about it and in the way you want people to react to it is possible under the informational snow conditions you describe. So as an example, they’re doing pretty indiscriminate cuts across the government right now. I think the thing you have to have a pretty low opinion of the government. And they do, but I don’t to think that’s not going to end up with problems emerging. They are cutting all kinds of employees, not really knowing where they’re cutting from. Cutting out probationary employees, I think is going to break. I think they might break at least. And then people are going to be upset about that breaking. This is why government reform is hard. As a bureaucrat. I mean, people wanted to modernize the IRS master file systems for decades. And the problem is they are very old and very easy to break. And if you break them, you break the entire tax filing system. And it’s just a huge, intense mess. And so does the kind of failures of getting from here to there require the breakings, the glitches, the fights mobilize too much of the public against you, create too much of these constant informational backlashes to do it. So there is this what is the optimal strategy. Under informational revolt conditions. Now what we have is a revolution. And it’s Thank goodness it’s an American style revolution. FDR had one, Reagan had one. Guillotines were not brought out. Nobody died. O.K, but you have a revolution. FDR and Reagan and this one are messy, all right. They’re just messy and mistakes will be made. I think if you want to have a pessimistic view, this is a remarkably unself reflective bunch. All right. There are a bunch of action people. I mean, Musk and even RFK jr. and certainly Trump. These are people who want to do things. That’s not a bad thing. But you need somebody to explain what the hell you’re doing. You need to explain, as we were talking about before, what’s the end state. Why did you take this step here. What are you doing it because the next step is going to be over there. And this is a logical place to be. Or just kind of like ramming through. And tearing up things as you go along. It is unclear to me, by the way, which of any of those cases, it is. It’s clear that Elon Musk has a plan and it’s all AI. But where he’s headed with that, I have no idea. I want to go back to a question, as we close that, I asked you at the beginning because I think this maybe puts a point on it. I’d asked, are elites today worse than they were. Do we think they’re worse than they were. Or have modern conditions led to them. US thinking they’re worse than they are, made them worse than they are. And when we’re having that conversation, I was thinking about something Julian Assange wrote, who was the founder of Wikileaks, and he basically said that the point of Wikileaks was that if you can pull all the internal information out of the system, make it public, you make it impossible for large systems to function because they need to have the ability to communicate privately. They need to be able to speak in secrecy. His view was that Wikileaks was actually a way of destroying the capacity of these bureaucracies to operate. And he thought they were bad, and that was a good thing. Like when I see Elon Musk doing right now is pulling in these informational tidbits, databases and using things that either he is sometimes lying about or things that he is pulling out to make look bad, right. We are funding a scientific research study that just sounds weird when you hear it, because frankly, a lot of them do. And a lot of important findings come out of weird research that those conditions of informational transparency, right. Many people make this argument that Congress has not been improved by the addition of c-span cameras. Hearings are not better because things can be clipped out of them, right. It just makes it harder for people to negotiate and deal. There’s all kinds of things where I don’t as an ideology, transparency and putting it all on the chain seems great and putting a camera on everything. Barack Obama used to say that negotiations over health care reform would all be on c-span. They weren’t. People got mad, but they would have been worse if they were all on c-span. You can’t negotiate everything in public. I’m curious how you think about that because this seems to me like the informational world we’re in creates a constant pressure for transparency. Transparency is typically either bad for her or bad for the way systems work, or is weaponized against systems by people who don’t like the way they are working or what they are trying to do. The system gets worse, and so we demand more transparency. Large, complex institutions need to have places where things happen in whispers that nobody hears to get anything done. Having said that, forget it ain’t going to happen. We are now in an entirely different world. So what we need is elites, people in charge of things. Let’s just call them that. Who can deal in this world where you’re under the spotlight at all times in a way that is number one, functional. You can get things done, but number two look trustworthy to the millions of people who are going to be watching you, either online or through some system or another. I mean, c-span is a joke. I mean, it’s not even I mean, I can’t believe that Congress having a camera in front of it doesn’t provide a show. I mean, there’s anything more disruptive, bizarre, and almost like theater of the absurd than watching those committees work. But they’ve had the opportunity. This is not the cameras fault. It’s their fault. All right. But it’s also not better when they try to provide a shot. I mean, I will just say this, that I think the move towards members of Congress are, what they’re trying to do is provide a show does not make hearings better. It incentivizes for grandstanders and performers and but that’s not a show. That’s grandstanding. There has to be a way in which the pieces that the show is, there’s a story and somebody’s controlling it. Somebody there’s a director and and then there’s a position and kind of like a trial. It’s kind of like a show. That’s not what happens. So I actually think it’s possible to do, I think with the digital. With AI in particular, it’s possible to get some version of that. But we need people in charge, people at the top of the institutions who are comfortable and believable in that role. You made this point that we’re now seeing the rise of these leaders who are genuinely comfortable in this information sphere, right. Donald Trump is native to Twitter. You called him the Beethoven of Twitter. Elon Musk liked Twitter so much he bought it and then renamed it x. And I think this is true for a lot of people in that administration. Some of them are very native to podcasting as well. You were suggesting this is a good thing. One thing that I worry about is that I sometimes think these systems select for a very unusual personality type, a personality type that is absorptive of huge amounts of negative feedback and uses that as a kind of fuel. A personality type that can be very. What it wants is engagement. What it wants is attention. It doesn’t have the reaction most normal human beings have to a lot of attention, which is to shrink back from it a little bit to be upset. If people are upset with you, it’s a little bit intentionally sociopathic. And so this idea that what we’re going to get now and that this is positive is rule by people who are really, really well adapted to Twitter. That’s a great idea. It’s ruled by sociopaths digital sociopaths. I think you’re right. My take though, is O.K. I said it before, there is this colossal transformation going on. We’re moving from the industrial age to something that doesn’t even have a name yet. And we’re a very early stage of this. And maybe the rule of the sociopath or the digital sociopath, hopefully will be an early stage that we transcend. I would say, to be present. Want to be president of the United States. You’re not a normal human being. All right, that’s fair. Already you are some kind of freak. And also, if I may give my Thirty Years’ War metaphor, am I allowed to do that. Please O.K. I was hoping you would do a Thirty Years’ War metaphor. Well, there you go. It’s not even mine. It’s originally from a fellow Cuban who said, suppose you take a timeout machine and go to the Thirty Years’ War, the bloodiest war that was ever fought in Europe. People were being slaughtered. And suppose you went there and you asked the man on the street, what do you think of the printing press. And the man would say, it’s the most horrific, conflict inducing thing that has ever been invented. Look over there. This is a little church, and over there there’s another little church, and they’re coming out with their books, their printed books. And the printed books have almost exactly the same words, but eight words are different. And they to kill each other over that. If we didn’t have a printing press, we’d be safe, right. Well, today we know that the printing press was the most liberating invention that ever happened in the human race. We had to get past that. And let’s be thankful, I always say. Building on Antonio’s metaphor, we’re not at a 30 year war level here. We’re not anywhere near that. So I think we will get past it. I think information systems have they cycle through moments of adjustments. My concern always has been that when we get to the end, I won’t see it, by the way, but when we get to the end, we have liberal democracy still there, maybe even more Democratic, because there are many things about the digital systems and AI that empower people far more than the old analog world did. So that’s my answer. Then I’ll ask our final question. What are three books you’d recommend to the audience. Three books. O.K anything by Andrey Mir. He is the Marshall McLuhan of the 21st century. But if I had to pick one, I would pick both journalism and the death of newspapers, which is basically a history of the art form, a very detailed history of the art form, kind of explaining. And your newspaper is kind of front and center explaining how the business model has changed from selling eyeballs to advertisers to commodifying polarization. Beautiful book. Second one, I would say a British economist, Paul Ormerod, has got a book called “Why Most Things Fail,” and you should read it. First of all, because it’s a great title. Number two, because as an economist, he’s gone through the data, mostly British and American data that goes back 150 years economic data and tried to solve basically the reason to try to solve issues like unemployment, segregated ethnically segregated households. And it’s a null hypothesis. Nothing has changed. So it’s a fascinating book. Third, Hugo Mercier. Not born yesterday. And it’s about what we talk about right now is can somebody like Elon Musk like a Donald Trump, talk to you, a fairly liberal human being and through the magic of disinformation, suddenly you walk away thinking, I will vote for that man. Whatever he goes. Can he persuade you through this manipulative process. And he has a lot of psychological data in there that pretty clearly explains. No not really. People tend not to be persuaded by oratory rhetoric and tend to believe what they believe. So Hugo Mercier, those are my three books. Martin Gary, Thank you very much. Hey, this is fun.