Opinion|Peace in Gaza Comes Down to This
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-gaza-peace.html
Guest Essay
Oct. 27, 2025, 1:00 a.m. ET

By James P. Rubin
Mr. Rubin was a senior adviser to two secretaries of state, Antony Blinken and Madeleine Albright.
This month’s cease-fire between Hamas and Israel has already been marked by clashes. The tenuous nature of the deal, along with reports of Washington’s potentially divisive recent proposal to split Gaza in two, shows that high hopes for a long-term peace in the region were premature.
A durable peace is still possible, but it will require the Trump administration to begin a serious, high-level diplomatic initiative right away. Occasional visits by Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, each with his own entourage and particular interests, is not good enough. With the momentum for diplomacy ebbing, speed is of the essence.
The linchpin of any lasting peace will be the creation and deployment of an international force, a feature of the U.S. peace plan that was announced by President Trump and endorsed by world leaders in Egypt earlier this month and that spawned the cease-fire. The force would create conditions to realize other aspects of the plan: filling the growing security vacuum in Gaza, allowing for Palestinian self-governance and ensuring that Israel will not be threatened. At a later stage, once the force is in place and can stabilize Gaza, the thornier political questions in the peace plan, such as how to disarm Hamas, can be addressed.
The painful truth is that the plan does not specify the crucial details needed to marshal such a force, which is to replace Israel Defense Forces as soon as possible, or how Gaza will be governed. It is encouraging that Mr. Rubio is finally talking about putting forward a U.N. resolution authorizing an international force for Gaza. But that should have been done immediately, since negotiating, finalizing and passing such a resolution can take weeks. Without a U.N. mandate in place, it is hard to imagine the creation of a force. Mr. Rubio should move from talking about a resolution to negotiating one — and stay focused on it until the resolution is passed by the 15-member U.N. Security Council.
During the Biden administration, I worked on a plan developed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, for governing and securing Gaza. I believe important elements of that plan could fill in some current blanks regarding a stabilization force.
The White House should deputize Mr. Blair to work with the U.S. Central Command, which covers the Middle East, to establish the military objectives and rules of engagement for the international force, which would have the broader responsibility of guarding Gaza’s borders so Hamas could not try again to import enough weaponry to threaten Israel. The force would also protect urgently needed humanitarian relief and, eventually, reconstruction operations from looters or criminals.
What happens if Israel sees an emerging threat and intervenes in Gaza? It is hard to imagine any members of the international force wanting to be seen as associated with Israeli military action. Without an international figure like Mr. Blair, who is trusted by Arab leaders and the Israeli government alike, and is ready to deal with such a scenario, the peace plan will almost certainly collapse. Mr. Blair could also address Israel’s desire to have a say in which countries make up the international force. Israel has already hinted that it did not want Turkey as a member of the force.
We will know that the force is not just an idea but a reality when a country is announced as a major troop contributor and given the commander role. The ideal candidate would be Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, whose president recognized the need for Israel’s security at the U.N. General Assembly in September and said he was ready to send troops. Hamas would be less likely to confront Indonesian soldiers or those from Arab countries.
Other countries likely to participate in such a force are Egypt and Azerbaijan, but it is difficult to turn general commitments into actual offers of personnel. Contributors understandably want to know that the mission is achievable and that they will not become tied to Israeli military action. They want assurance from mediators that Hamas would not interfere with their deployment. Another sign of seriousness of purpose would be to identify an American as deputy commander who could then coordinate the intelligence, logistics, transportation and other tasks the United States military can contribute. The stationing of American personnel at the recently established Civil-Military Coordination Center in Israel is a step in the right direction. But Arab force contributors won’t want their headquarters to be in Israel. Egypt would be a more plausible location.
With a clear plan, a U.N. resolution and a main troop contributor identified, it would then be much easier to fill out the force with actual commitments of personnel and expand the training of a Palestinian contingent, which would ideally over time replace the international forces, as envisioned in the Trump plan.
Without these steps, the situation in Gaza is likely to deteriorate as Hamas tries to reassert its power, notwithstanding that the Trump plan called for its disarmament. Many people in Gaza are desperate for an alternative to Hamas and to continued Israeli occupation. An international force gives each party what it needs. The Israelis gain confidence that their security will be ensured. The Palestinians get the Israelis out and Hamas sidelined.
Only then can the next set of difficult questions be resolved. Who among the Palestinians is to govern Gaza? What does the disarmament of Hamas look like? Is the Trump Board of Peace really going to do the day-to-day work of the most complex peace operation of modern times in a way that Israel feels secure and Palestinians misery can begin to be addressed?
The Trump administration does not appear to have thought through those hard questions. If there is one thing I learned working on this issue during the two Clinton administrations and the Biden administration, it is that progress in the Middle East requires intense, sustained and expert attention from the highest levels of government.
James P. Rubin was a senior adviser to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and is a host, with Christiane Amanpour, of The Ex Files podcast.
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